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COMMENTS
THE DWINDLING RIGHTS OF TEACHERS AND THE
CLOSING COURTHOUSE DOOR
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, teachers and the school authorities that employ them have
been waging a major battle in the courts throughout the country.' The
conflict arises from the unique character of the teaching profession in our
society. It is agreed that teachers or at least the schools stand in loco parentis
with their students. It is unclear, however, in the place of which parent the
teacher stands. Some believe that teachers, like Caesar's wife,2 must be above
reproach and subservient to the wishes of the most pious in the community, 3
because teachers are expected to be "role-models" 4 for their pupils. On the
other hand, some would argue that teachers cannot be required to surrender
constitutionally protected rights as a condition to their employment.S
This Comment will survey recent decisions in which teachers have chal-
lenged actions6 against them claiming that they were impermissible infringe-
ments upon their rights to freedom of association,7 speech,8 privacy, 9 and
equal protection of the laws.' 0 There will also be a brief discussion of the
jurisdictional bases for bringing actions in federal courts," the unique prob-
lems facing the non-tenured teacher,' 2 and the remedies available to a teacher
who has been unconstitutionally denied employment.'
3
1. See generally L. Fischer & D. Schimmel, The Civil Rights of Teachers (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Fischer & Schimmel]; D. Rubin, The Rights of Teachers (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Rubin]; Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke L.J. 841.
2. Plutarch, The Life of Caesar.
3. E.g., a 1969 conversation with the associate superintendent of public instruction for the
state of California:
"Superintendent Teaching is a privilege, not a right. If one wants this privilege, he has to give
up some of his rights.
"Author: Just what constitutional right does one have to give up in order to enter teaching?
"Superintendent Any right his community wants him to give up." Fischer & Schimmel, supra
note 1, at 6.
4. Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1974).
5. E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
6. The actions under examination include dismissal, suspension, and non-renewal of a
contract that has expired.
7. See notes 36 to 49 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 50 to 94 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 95 to 126 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 146 to 165 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 198 to 220 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 166 to 197 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 221 to 244 infra and accompanying text.
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H. HISTORY
Perhaps the most celebrated case involving a teacher's rights was the
"Monkey Trial," Scopes v. State. 14 In Scopes, a young biology teacher was
discharged for teaching "a certain theory that denied the story of the divine
creation of man, as taught in the Bible, and did teach instead thereof that
man had descended from a lower order of animals."" The view of the
Tennessee Supreme Court was that the Constitution did not apply to public
employees at all, declaring that, "[iln dealing with its own employees engaged
upon its own work, the State is not hampered by the limitations of . . . the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."',6 Indeed,
prevailing attitudes of proper teacher behavior at that time indicated that
celibacy and purity of thought and conduct were not only to be hoped for, but
in some instances were required. 17
The initial reactions of other courts in public employment cases generally
were comparable to that of the Tennessee court in Scopes. They allowed the
states, as employers, to condition employment on the surrender of constitu-
tional rights. 18 As Justice Holmes, then a member of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, wrote at the turn of the century: "[t]he petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman."' 19
14. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The progeny of Scopes continue to occupy the
courts. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Supreme Court declared an Arkansas
"anti-evolution" statute unconstitutional as violative of the first amendment's establishment of
religion clause. See also Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second
Consumption?, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 209 (1974).
15. 154 Tenn. at 108, 289 S.W. at 363.
16. Id. at 112, 289 S.W. at 365.
17. "The following excerpts from a teacher's contract illustrate conditions that were not
uncommon in the 1920s:
"I promise to take a vital interest in all phases of Sunday-school work, donating of my time,
service, and money without stint for the uplift and benefit of the community.
"I promise to abstain from all dancing, immodest dressing, and any other conduct unbecom-
ing a teacher and a lady.
"I promise not to go out with any young men except in so far as it may be necessary to
stimulate Sunday-school work.
"I promise not to fall in love, to become engaged or secretly married.
"I promise not to encourage or tolerate the least familiarity on the part of any of my boy pupils.
"I promise to sleep at least eight hours a night, to eat carefully, and to take every precaution to
keep in the best of health and spirits, in order that I may be better able to render efficient service
to my pupils.
"I promise to remember that I owe a duty to the townspeople who are paying me my wages,
that I owe respect to the school board and the superintendent that hired me, and that I shall
consider myself at all times the willing servant of the school board and the townspeople." Fischer
& Schimmel, supra note 1, at 1-2.
18. See Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 Iowa
L. Rev. 1256 (1974).
19. McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
DWINDLING RIGHTS OF TEACHERS
As recently as 1952, in Adler v. Board of Education,20 the Supreme Court
apparently agreed, declaring that, while teachers "have the right under our
law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will.... [ilt is equally clear
that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own
terms."21 The Court stated that the teacher would have to abide by the terms
laid down by the proper authorities. If these were not satisfactory, the Court
continued, "they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go
elsewhere." '22 Such requirements were not considered a deprivation of any
constitutionally protected rights.2 3
However, in 1967, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,2 4 the Court struck
down the same New York loyalty statute it had upheld in Adler. The Court
held that membership alone in a "subversive" organization would not be a
sufficient basis for disqualification from public employment, saying "legisla-
tion which sanctions membership unaccompanied by specific intent to further
the unlawful goals of the organization . . . violates constitutional limita-
tions." 25 Thus, the Court protected the teacher's right to associate, making
the requirement for dismissal as rigorous as that which it had created for
criminal prosecutions. 26
The Court reinforced its position regarding the teacher's right to associate
in Perry v. Sindernann.27 In Perry, a non-tenured college instructor alleged
that he was refused re-employment because he was active in a teachers' union
and had testified before committees of the Texas legislature in opposition to
the college administration's policy. 28 The Supreme Court, in reversing the
trial courts summary dismissal of the complaint, held that the reasons alleged
to have been relied upon by the school board were violative of the teacher's
first amendment rights. The Court made dear that it was not advocating that
20. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Adler upheld the constitutionality of New York's Feinberg Law,
N.Y. Educ. Law § 3022 (McKinney 1970), which provided for the dismissal of teachers who
were members of any organization advocating the overthrow of the government by force, violence
or any unlawful means and was intended to curb the presence of Communists in the schools.
21. 342 U.S. at 492 (citation omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
25. Id. at 608. Although Keyishian struck down the statute upheld in Adler, it did not
specifically overrule the earlier case, but impliedly rejected its rationale. See id. at 605-06. The
result has been two lines of cases-those that uphold disciplinary actions for the exercise of
constitutional rights cite Adler, while those that reverse cite Keyishian. A recent example of this
dichotomy is the majority and dissenting opinions in Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.
1975), discussed at text accompanying notes 37-49 infra.
26. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1067 (1968).
27. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
28. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1970), afr'd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Although Sindermann was not tenured, he did allege the existence of a "de facto" tenure system
at the university. The Court said that proof of "de facto" tenure might be a sufficient "property"
interest to require a hearing before non-renewal of the teacher's contract. 408 U.S. at 599-602; see
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
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a teacher had a "right" to a "valuable governmental benefit," but merely that
such a benefit cannot be denied on a basis that infringed upon constitutionally
protected rights.29 The Court reasoned that if the government could deny a
benefit for such a reason, the teacher's exercise of his rights "would in effect
be penalized and inhibited," thus permitting the government to control
indirectly what it was unable to control outright. 3"
It appeared at the time that Perry guaranteed that teachers would enjoy the
full spectrum of constitutional rights. This, however, has not proven to be the
case, since the conflicting rights of the community had yet to be considered. In
an earlier attempt to reconcile this conflict where it involved freedom of
speech, the Supreme Court, in Pickering v. Board of Education,31 promul-
gated a "balancing test." In Pickering, the plaintiff, a high school teacher,
was dismissed because he wrote a letter critical of school board athletic
policies to the newspapers, during a referendum on an educational bond issue.
The Supreme Court foreshadowed its holding in Perry in reversing the
dismissal. The Court cautioned, however, that the state did have legitimate
interests as an employer that differed from its interests in regulation of the
speech of the general public. To resolve the dilemma of the conflicting
interests, the Court suggested that
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher,
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.
32
29. 408 U.S. at 597. "For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially, his interest in freedom of speech." Id.
See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972).
30. 408 U.S. at 597.
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32. Id. at 568. Balancing tests have not been without controversy. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967), a case which balanced the individual's right to privacy against the freedom of the
press, Justice Black discussed the problem of applying balancing tests to first amendment rights:
"The 'weighing' doctrine plainly encourages and actually invites judges to choose for themselves
between conflicting values, even where, as in the First Amendment, the Founders made a choice
of values, one of which is a free press. Though the Constitution requires that judges swear to
obey and enforce it, it is not altogether strange that all judges are not always dead set against
constitutional interpretations that expand their powers, and that when power is once claimed by
some, others are loath to give it up.
"[I]f the judicial balancing choice of constitutional changes is to be adopted by this Court, I
could wish it had not started on the First Amendment. The freedoms guaranteed by that
Amendment are essential freedoms in a government like ours. That Amendment was deliberately
written in language designed to put its freedoms beyond the reach of government to change while
it remained unrepealed. If judges have, however, by their own fiat today created a right of
privacy equal to or superior to the right of a free press that the Constitution created, then
tomorrow and the next day and the next, judges can create more rights that balance away other
cherished Bill of Rights freedoms." Id. at 399-400 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
[Vol. 44
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At the same time, the Court placed two limitations on the scope of its decision
which have been the source of almost constant litigation ever since. First, the
Court cautioned that it was reserving decision on the situation where either
discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among co-workers was in
issue.33 In addition, the Court pointed out that its opinion dealt only with the
protection of teachers' comments on matters of public interest.3 4 The Court
did not say that speech which raised a question of discipline by a superior or
which was not on a matter of public interest was unprotected, but rather
noted that "significantly different considerations would be involved in such
cases."35
The task of balancing the interests of the community, as represented by the
employer school board, against the right of the teachers to be protected in the
exercise of their constitutional rights was thus left to a case-by-case resolution
in the federal courts. The recent products of this struggle and the significance
of the approaches that the courts have taken will be the focal point of the
balance of this Comment.
III. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The decisions concerning the teacher's right of association, and in particular
membership in controversial organizations, have been dominated by the
presence of Keyishian. It has been argued that under Keyishian
no school board or state legislature could dikqualify teachers who are members of the
Black Panther Party, the American Nazi Party, or any other revolutionary, extremist,
33. 391 U.S. at 570. The Court refused to speculate on what its decision would be where a
relationship existed between a supervisor and a subordinate that was "of such a personal and
intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would
seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between them.. . ." Id. at 570
n.3. The results in later cases suggest the question is resolved in favor of the school board. See
notes 57-61 infra and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 574. The Court stated that in a case such as this, Pickering's false statements could
not serve as grounds for dismissal unless those false statements were knowingly or recWklessly
made. Id. See Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' Speech- The Aftermath of Pickering, 59
Iowa L. Rev. 1256, 1263-65 (1974).
35. 391 U.S. at 570 n.3. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974), discussed the impact of limiting the speech of federal employees: "The fact that appellee in
the present case inveighed against his superior is irrelevant. The matter on which he spoke was in
the public domain. His speaking may well have aroused such animosity in his superior as to
disqualify him from being in charge of disciplinary proceedings; and conceivably it could cause
disharmony among workers. And these consequences are quite antagonistic to the image which
agencies have built. .. .
"... It is, of course, none of a court's problem what the employment policies may be. But once
an employee speaks out on a public issue and is punished for it, we have a justiciable issue.
Appellee is in my view being penalized by the Federal Government for exercising his right to
speak out The excuse or pretense is an Act of Congress and an agency's regulations promulgated
under it in the teeth of the First Amendment: 'Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ... .' Losing one's job with the Federal Government because
of one's discussion of an issue in the public domain is certainly an abridgment of speech." Id.
at 204-06 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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or controversial organization unless it could show that the teacher specifically intended
to pursue the organization's illegal aims and activities. 36
One of the most interesting and controversial recent offspring of Keyishian
was Cook v. Hudson.37 In this case, three public school teachers were not
rehired because they sent their children to a racially discriminatory private
school. The district court upheld the school board saying that the board had
acted within its discretion in implementing a desegregation order. 38 The
board argued that the teachers would be less effective because their students
would feel a sense of inferiority due to the teachers' own actions. 39 The
district court also accepted the implication that "teachers who send their own
children to a segregated school manifest a belief that segregation is desirable
in education and a distrust in desegregated schools." 40 The court concluded
that this was sufficient justification for the decision of the board and that it
was "in keeping with the command of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
desegregation order . . . to eliminate racial discrimination and remove its
pervasive influence from the county's public schools." 4'
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed; the majority in separate opinions
essentially held that the action was within the discretion of the school board in
deciding how to implement the desegregation order. 42 The dissent declared
36. Fischer & Schimmel, supra note 1, at 94. One interesting precursor to Keyishian was
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional an
Arkansas law requiring teachers to file an annual list of organizations to which they belonged or
contributed. The Court ruled that the disclosure requirement, with its "unlimited and indiscrimi-
nate sweep," went "far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate
inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers" and impermissibly inhibited the teachers'
right of free association. Id. at 490. See generally Fischer & Schimmel, supra note 1, at 74-95;
Rubin, supra note 1, at 86-94. See also Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
1361 (1963).
37. 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
38. 365 F. Supp. at 860-61.
39. Id. at 860; see Comment, Cook v. Hudson: The State's Interest in Integration Versus the
First Amendment Rights of the Public School Teacher, 45 Miss. L.J. 953 (1974); 6 N.C. Central
L.J. 107 (1974).
40. 365 F. Supp. at 860. Apart from the psychological testimony that the teachers' actions
would have an impact on the students, there was no evidence that the plaintiffs were other than
competent teachers. See Brief for Appellant at 11, Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
On appeal, Judge Clark, dissenting, declarec "Today's case is cast in the appealing garb of
reinforcing public school desegregation by suppressing the right to educate one's child in a
segregated private school. . . . Another such victory, bought at the expense of surrendering
constitutionally protected rights to the expertise of psychological opinion, and we are undone."
Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744, 757 (5th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion).
In McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 197.5), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3279
(U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (No. 75-62), the Fourth Circuit, in outlawing "white academies," ruled
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) "is violated by the school as long as the basis of exclusion (of
students] is racial, for it is then clear that the black applicant is denied a contractual right which
would have been granted to him if he had been white." Id. at 1087.
41. 365 F. Supp. at 860.
42. Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
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that the school board could not infringe upon teachers' constitutional right of
free association; i.e., their right "as parents to choose the academic environ-
ment in which their children will be educated,"'43 unless the board could
prove that such activities "substantially and materially" interfered with the
operation of the schools.44 Five judges joined in dissenting from a denial of a
petition for a rehearing en banc, saying that the teachers' "rights [were]
trampled by the school district's arbitrary edict of forced conformity in a
citizen's private life."'45
In accord with the dissenting view in Cook is the 1967 opinion of the
Fourth Circuit in Johnson v. Branch.46 In Johnson, the court reversed a
decision upholding the dismissal of a high school English teacher because of
her civil rights activities. The plaintiff had participated in a demonstration at
a local restaurant, in a voter registration drive, and in a federal voting suit.
The court would not allow the school board to infringe upon the teacher's
freedom to associate or to voice her ideas and opinions, declaring that it was
self-evident that the objections held either by the Board or the Principal to the
plaintiff's exercise of her personal and associational liberty to express her feelings about
segregation would not justify refusal to renew her contract so long as these activities
did not interfere with her performance of her school work.47
Thus, the holding in Keyishian, that a teacher's associational activities
must, in effect, be criminal to provide a constitutional basis for dismissal, has
been weakened by the decision in Cook v. Hudson. The holding in the older
Johnson case and the dissent in Cook 48 would have apparently allowed the
dismissal if the school board could show a "material and substantial" interfer-
ence with the operation of the school.49 However, the majority in Cook did
43. Id. at 750 (dissenting opinion); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1 1SO (D.D.C.), aff'd sub
nom. Colt v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (freedom of association supports the right to educate
child in the school of parent's choice).
44. 511 F.2d at 757 (dissenting opinion). But cf. Berry v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 380
F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Ala. 1971). In Berry, the court ordered reinstatement of a bus driver and a
mechanic who were not rehired by the school board after sending their children to racially
discriminatory schools. The court declared that: 'Trihe action of [plaintiffs] in sending their
children to a private school... was conduct which [they] were entitled to engage in under the
United States Constitution. That freedom is infringed upon when a school board attaches onerous
conditions to employment." Id. at 1247. It is arguable whether Berry would have been decided as
it was had Cook v. Hudson preceded it. At the same time, the different societal requirements for
teachers and for bus drivers and mechanics might be sufficient to account for the contrary results,
notwithstanding the broad language of the court in Berry.
45. Cook v. Hudson, 515 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1975).
46. 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
47. Id. at 182.
48. See Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d at 757 (Clark, J., dissenting). "The failure of the evidence
to demonstrate that their protected activity would substantially and materially interfere with the
discharge of their teaching duties and responsibilities should have brought the balance down on
the teachers' side." Id.
49. In a more recent case involving a type of extracurricular activity similar to that
guaranteed in Johnson, the Eighth Circuit in Evans v. Page, 516 F.Zd 18 (8th Cir. 1975), upheld
1975]
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not require such a showing. In the special context of school districts under a
desegregation order, it held it to be within the discretion of the school board
to limit a teacher's freedom of association. The approach taken by the court in
Johnson seems more reasonable under the circumstances. If a teacher's
associations do not impair his effectiveness nor interfere with school opera-
tions, the community should not be able to dictate his exercise of constitution-
ally guaranteed rights. If, on the other hand, his associations are more than
just an embarrassment, and impair performance in some way, the school
board would be justified in ordering dismissal. Such a decision, however,
ought to be dictated by specific circumstances, and not by general rules and
regulations.
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM
The Pickering decision could have been the final word on freedom of
speech for teachers outside the classroom. 50 Unfortunately, as a result of its
qualifications, it actually opened the way to more tests of teachers' rights than
it settled. Pickering is virtually self-distinguishing, protecting only teacher
comments on matters of public interest which will not cause disharmony
among co-workers nor undermine the effectiveness of the working relation-
ship with a superior.5 '
Recent decisions in the Ninth, Third, and Tenth Circuits illustrate how the
courts have used Pickering both to limit and expand the rights of teachers. In
Gray v. Union County Intermediate Education District,5 2 the Ninth Circuit
upheld the decision of a school board which had refused to renew plaintiff's
contract as a special education teacher because she had advised a pregnant
student of her "right"5 3 to a therapeutic abortion. The student was mentally
retarded and had been made a ward of the state welfare department, which
had decided an abortion was not in her best interests, S4 but the teacher
a school board action in not renewing plaintiffs contract as a teacher's aide because she had
served as an election official during a school board election contrary to the wishes of the school
superintendent. The court said "The right allegedly infringed in this case, i.e., the right to serve
as an official in a school board election, is neither a constitutional right nor a basic personal right
secured under federal law." Id. at 21. Rather, the court said it was a privilege arising under state
law and thus, not a question for the federal courts. Id.
50. See generally, on the question of teachers' freedom of speech, Fischer & Schimmel, supra
note 1, at 14-28; Rubin, supra note 1, at 48-68; Frakt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitu-
tion, 18 U. Kan. L. Rev. 27, 30-31 (1969); Griffis & Wilson, Constitutional Rights and Remedies
in the Non-Renewal of a Public School Teacher's Employment Contract, 25 Baylor L. Rev. 549,
552-55 (1973); Moskowitz & Casagrande, Teachers and the First Amendment- Academic Freedom
and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 39 Albany L. Rev.
661, 672-76 (1975); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970
Duke L.J. 841, 848-54; Note, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Outside the Classroom: An
Analysis of the Application of Pickering and Tinker, 8 Ga. L. Rev. 900 (1974); Note, Judicial
Protection of Teachers' Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 1256 (1974).
51. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
52. 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 804. Actually, abortion was illegal in Oregon. Id. at 807.
54. Id.
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persisted in engaging in a "heated discussion" with the psychiatrist who had
examined the girl, expressing her opposition to the caseworker, telephoning
the judge overseeing the girl's custody, and speaking to the pregnant girl and
her relatives contrary to welfare department instructions. The court con-
cluded that Mrs. Gray's activities were not protected free speech."s Also, since
the welfare department needed to maintain a close working relationship with
the school board, the court placed Gray into one of the loopholes of Pickering.
It reasoned that Mrs. Gray's actions, which had strained relations between
the school board and the welfare department, raised issues concerning disci-
pline by an immediate superior and harmony among co-workers. S6
In Rosernan v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,5 7 the Third Circuit
affirmed the non-renewal of a non-tenured professor who, during a faculty
meeting, accused the acting chairman of her department of wrongfully
suppressing another professor's application for the chairmanship.58 The court
distinguished Pickering on the grounds that Roseman's comments were not
made in an open forum and did not concern an issue of public interest, and
also that the comments called into question the integrity of her immediate
superior. 59 The latter ground was explicitly left open in Pickering.60 The
court concluded that the plaintiffs actions were, therefore, outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment. 6'
Not all speech-related activities which displease superiors will justify a
dismissal. In Rampey v. Allen, 62 eleven professors and three administrative
55. "The appellant's activities went beyond free speech. Although the first amendment
entitles an individual to voice controversial ideas, it does not entitle him to try to force his ideas
and opinions upon others through harassment or other means." Id.
56. Id., quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1968).
57. 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975).
58. Id. at 1366. Dean McGovern, who chaired the meeting, specifically invited Roseman
to speak. Id. "[Pilaintiff asserts that in connecting her with the accusations against Faust [the
acting chairman], McGovern broke a promise to 'keep her "name out of the matter.'" The district
court did not find that such a promise had been made ..... Id. at 1366 n.6. See Cotten v. Board
of Regents, 395 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975). In
Cotten, a non-tenured pharmacology professor alleged that the non-renewal of his contract was in
retaliation for his exercise of freedom of speech. Plaintiff had openly criticized his superior, but
the court found the action was based on a judgment that the restoration of harmony within the
school outweighed the advantages of renewing plaintiffs contract. Id. at 392. In granting
summary judgment for the defendants the court noted that speech which causes disharmony with
a superior is not protected by Pickering. Id. at 394.
59. 520 F.2d at 1368.
60. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
61. 520 F.2d at 1369. One of the court's observations highlights potential weaknesses of the
Pickering qualifications: "[I]f Roseman's communications to McGovern. . . at the faculty meeting
had been on issues of public interest, or if she had convinced local news media that her grievance
against Faust (the acting chairman] was newsworthy, entirely different considerations would
come into play." Id. at 1369 n.11. It is unclear whether the court meant by this that the news
media can decide what types of comments will qualify for increased protection under the pub-
lic interest limitation of the Pickering decision. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
62. 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
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employees of Oklahoma College of Liberal Arts were discharged. 63 The
college president testified that he dismissed the plaintiffs because they were
"divisive" and unwilling to talk informally with him, and notably, "because
they had a tendency to talk among themselves and with the students. '64 In
disallowing the school's action, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that it was the
"personal and subjective" views of the college president that had led to the
dismissals, and that the plaintiffs had a "right to be free from this kind of
personality control."'65 The reversal was also based in part on the fact that the
college did not show that the plaintiffs' activities were "excessive or unduly
burdensome to the school." 66
In another Tenth Circuit decision, Bertot v. School District No. 1,67
involving the non-renewal of the contracts of two school teachers, one of the
plaintiffs alleged that her contract was not renewed because she spoke on the
students' side of a dress code dispute on a local radio show. 68 But the board
members testified that her appearance on the radio show did not influence
their judgment; rather the decision was based on their knowledge of "disci-
pline problems and antagonism of students." 69 The court upheld the jury
verdict for the school board in this instance because the teacher had not
sustained the burden of proof.70
The other teacher involved in the case was not rehired because she
encouraged the publication of an underground newspaper by her English
honors class. 71 The court held that her assistance and association with the
publication of the newspaper was a protected activity under the first amend-
ment. 72 The justification offered, "that such publications tend to 'degener-
ate,' " was found to be "inadequate, being no more than an undifferentiated
fear, which cannot serve to infringe free speech rights." 73
The recent decisions concerning teachers' speech outside the classroom have
interpreted the balancing test of Pickering to require the school authorities to
show some substantial interference with the operation of the school before the
speech activities will lose their constitutional protection. However, the extent
63. Id. at 1092. The plaintiffs had criticized the president of the college and some members of
the Board of Regents at a press conference, but this was found not to be the basis for their
dismissals. Id. at 1091-92.
64. Id. at 1092.
65. Id. at 1098. See 1975 Utah L. Rev. 234.
66. 501 F.2d at 1098. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
67. 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 1178-79. The principal's written comments to the school board stated that "[alt that
point, such public involvement by a school person [in the dress code controversy] could quite
possibly have hampered the progress being made by the student councils and by the Board." Id.
at 1178.
69. Id. at 1179.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1180, 1181-83.
72. Id. at 1184.
73. Id. at 1183. Applying the balancing test advocated by Pickering, the court resolved the
case in favor of the plaintiff because there was no showing that her actions impeded the "per-
formance of her classroom duties or interfered with the regular operation of the school ... .
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to which the courts will examine the validity of the school board's claim of
interference has varied.
The Third Circuit seemed content to interpret Pickering narrowly holding
that if the nature of the communications could be distinguished from the
communications at issue in Pickering, they would not gain the protection of
the first amendment. 74 At the same time, the court did mention that the
attack on the integrity of the acting department chairman would have a
disruptive effect on harmonious relations within the school, 75 and that such
an attack would fall outside Pickering's protection.
The Ninth Circuit gave weight to the notion that the comments in issue
raised a question of discipline by an immediate superior, again narrowly
interpreting Pickering to place such comments outside its protection. The
court was also concerned with the effect of her comments--in this case,
resulting in a pregnant student's removal from school before the completion of
the school term. 76
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit in Bertot, in interpreting Pickering
more broadly, was primarily concerned with the actual effect of the teacher's
activities. Since the school authorities had not shown that the publication of
the newspaper had any actual impact on the operation of the school, the court
would not allow the dismissal simply on the basis that the teacher's activity
displeased her superiors.
It would seem that all three decisions can be reconciled on the basis of a
strict interpretation of Pickering. Where a teacher's comments have dearly
disrupted the harmony of the school and made its effective operation impossi-
ble, or clearly created problems of discipline with a superior, no court would
argue that Pickering would afford protection. But Pickering's protection
should encompass all speech that is not exposed by these exceptions. Thus,
speech which is controversial but has no serious repercussions, and which
therefore does not impair the effectiveness of the teacher should not be
restricted, and the teacher in this situation should not be penalized. By
limiting the application of the Pickering exceptions to those situations that
dearly meet their requirements, the basic holding of that case will be
effectuated and teachers will be protected in their exercise of rights guaran-
teed to them.
V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE CLASSROOM
The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving a teacher's dismissal
as a result of the use of offensive language in the classroom. 77 The leading
74. Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, 520 F.2d 1364, 1369 (3d Cir. 1975).
75. Id. at 1368. The court also noted that, 'tlhe trade-off between vigorous intra-
departmental debate and the harmonious atmosphere essential to academic pursuits is a matter of
departmental, not constitutional, concern." Id. at 1369 n.13.
76. Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1975).
77. On a teacher's freedom of speech inside the classroom, see generally Fischer & Schimmel,
supra note 1, at 29-44; Rubin, supra note 1, at 24-47; Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression
Within the Classroom: A Search for Standards, 8 Ga. L. Rev. 837 (1974); 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1341
(1973) (the right to engage in mild political expression). See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
1975)
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decisions in the area, therefore, have come from the various courts of appeals,
and in particular from the First Circuit.
In Keefe v. Geanakos,78 the court held that a tenured high school teacher
could not be dismissed for assigning to his senior English class a controversial
article in Atlantic Monthly. 79 The court recognized that some public regula-
tion of classroom speech is inherent in any provision of public education, and
that what is appropriate for students is not to be judged by adult obscenity
standards.8 0 However, the court said the dismissal was improper because the
"chilling effect" it would have on teachers' freedom of speech would demean
"any proper concept of education," especially since, in the court's opinion, the
article had educational value.8 '
The First Circuit, in Mailloux v. Kiley, 82 elaborated on the factors it would
consider in deciding whether a teacher's use of offensive language would be
grounds for dismissal. There, the court declared that the issue was best left to
a case-by-case inquiry considering "the age and sophistication of the students,
the closeness of the relation between the specific technique used and some
concededly valid educational objective, and the context and manner of
presentation." 83
In a recent case, Brubaker v. Board of Education,84 the Seventh Circuit
was faced with material far more controversial than that involved in Keefe.
There, three non-tenured elementary school teachers were discharged for
distributing to their eighth grade classes a brochure from the movie
"Woodstock. ' 85 The school board found that the material was obscene,
suggestive and that it promoted a viewpoint "contrary to the requirements of
the laws of the State in regard to teaching about the harmful effects of
alcoholic drinks and narcotics .... ,,86 The court affirmed the dismissals,
saying that no expert testimony was required to show the materials were
obscene and that "these teachers should have known better than to hand to
U.S. 234 (1957) (legislature could not inquire into the content of a college professor's lectures);
Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970)
(controversial political and social issues); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School Dist., 376 F. Supp.
657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussion of controversial social and
political issues).
78. 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
79. Id. at 361.
80. Id. at 362.
81. Id. The court found the article was "in no sense pornographic" but was "scholarly,
thoughtful and thought-provoking." Id. at 361.
82. 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 1243.
84. 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
85. Id. at 975. Clara Brubaker was a French teacher who placed the brochures in the
teacher's lounge and displayed a poster from the brochure in her classroom but did not give ie
brochure to students. Ronald Stewart, a language arts teacher, and John Brubaker, an industrial
arts teacher, both made the brochure available to their students, but not as part of any course
work. Id. at 976, 979.
86. Id. at 976.
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their young students something that invited the use of . . . drugs. '1 a1 It
indicated further that it did not intend "to give carte blanche in the name of
academic freedom to conduct which can reasonably be deemed both offensive
and unnecessary to the accomplishment of educational objectives."8 8 Relying
on the guidelines proposed in Mailloux the court concluded that the school
board's action was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not invade the
teacher's constitutional rights.8 9
Since the language in the material in Brubaker was not very different from
that allowed in Keefe, the differentiating factors seem to have been the age of
the students and the relevancy of the material to the curriculum. 90
A recent district court case in the Fifth Circuit may have added another
criterion to those previously enumerated. In Parducci v. Rutland,9 a high
school teacher in Montgomery, Alabama was dismissed for assigning to her
eleventh grade English class "Welcome to the Monkey House," a short story
by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., which contained several vulgar terms and a reference
to an act of rape. 92 The court placed the burden of proof on the school
district-
Since the defendants have failed to show either that the assignment was inappropriate
reading for high school juniors, or that it created a significant disruption to the
educational processes of this school, this Court concludes that plaintiff's dismissal
constituted an unwarranted invasion of her First Amendment right to academic
freedom.
9 3
Thus, in addition to the educational objective, the manner of presentation,
and the age of the students, the effect might, if sufficiently disruptive, be
grounds for dismissal.
As in other areas previously examined, courts use a balancing test to reach
their result when teachers choose to employ controversial material or language
in teaching. In the area of classroom speech, the burden in such a test is
placed on the school authorities to demonstrate that the teacher's method "(1)
... is not relevant to the subject being taught, (2)... is not appropriate to the age
87. Id. at 984.
88. Id. at 984-85 (emphasis deleted), quoting Mailloux v. Kiley, 436 F.2d 565, 566 (lst Cir.
1971). See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
89. 502 F.2d at 983.
90. None of the teachers in Brubaker claimed that the brochure involved was relevant to the
curriculum. Id. at 979. The dissent, however, argued that the brochure did have some relevancy,
as one class had been studying rock music and the other class had been studying the construction
of musical instruments. Id. at 991 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). The language and literature
involved in Keefe was more dearly relevant to the curriculum, as the plaintiff was an English
teacher. 418 F.2d at 360.
91. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
92. Id. at 353, 355.
93. Id. at 356 (emphasis added). See Moskowitz & Casagrande, Teachers and the First
Amendment: Academic Freedom and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, 39 Albany L. Rev. 661, 679-80 (1975).
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and maturity of the students, or (3)... disrupts school discipline .... ,,94 before
the actions will lose the protection of the first amendment. As with the exercise of
freedom of association and speech outside the classroom, a wider range of state
interests has been raised to balance the teacher's exercise of his freedom to teach.
In most of the cases examined, the teacher's activities and discretion have been
allowed as reasonable and relevant pedagogic tools, appropriate for the students
he is teaching. In the one case where the dismissals were affirmed, the material
distributed lacked any relevancy to the subjects being taught, betrayed a
disturbing lack of judgment by the teachers, and created a furor in the school
system. Under the circumstances, their dismissals were understandable and fit
within the guidelines laid down by Mailloux and Parducci. The teacher's
freedom of speech within the classroom, however, rests on much more delicate
bases than the freedoms previously examined. The effect of its abuse can be far
more dangerous to those most vulnerable-the students. At the same time, the
teachers must be allowed the freedom to teach effectively. The guidelines
adopted in Mailloux and Parducci represent reasonable solutions to this most
difficult of problems. So long as they are discretely applied to those situations
that clearly represent abuses of discretion, the system will continue to function
effectively and the students will be well served.
VI. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
At one time, a teacher's conduct outside the classroom was more important
to his employer than his conduct within the classroom. "For example, until
World War I, '[d]ancing, card playing, smoking, drinking, theatre-going, and
Sabbath-breaking were still regarded by multitudes as sinful.... The teacher
was expected in all these matters to be exemplary.' "9 In recent years, how-
ever, the courts have considerably circumscribed "immoral conduct" dismissals.
A. Homosexuals
The federal courts have yet to decide whether homosexuality per se is a
valid basis for teacher dismissal. Several recent cases, faced with the problem
of homosexual teachers, have reacted in a variety of ways.
In Acanfora v. Board of Education,96 a non-tenured homosexual teacher
challenged a school board which transferred him to a non-teaching position
shortly after he appeared with his parents on a television program which was
designed to help parents and homosexual children cope with the problems
confronting them.9 7 The district court found that Acanfora's public activities
94. Fischer & Schimmel, supra note 1, at 43.
95. Rubin, supra note 1, at 108, quoting H. Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching In
American Schools 170-71 (1941). See generally, on a teacher's right to privacy, Fischer &
Schimmel, supra note 1, at 45-52; Rubin, supra, at 108-16; Comment, Unfitness to Teach:
Credential Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual Conduct, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1442 (1973). See also
Note, Application of the Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dismissals from Public
Employment, 1973 Duke L.J. 1037.
96. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974). See 48 Temp. L.Q. 384 (1975).
97. 491 F.2d at 500. Acanfora stressed on the broadcast that he would not discuss his
sexuality with his students. Id.
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were outside the protection of the first amendment and denied relief. 98 The
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs public comments were protected by the
first amendment, but denied relief for lack of standing. 99
In Burton v. Cascade School District Union High School, 100 a non-tenured
female teacher was dismissed because she was a "practicing homosexual."10 '
The court held that the firing was wrongful because the Oregon statute which
provided for dismissals for "immorality" was unconstitutionally vague.' 0 2 As
in Acanfora, the issue of the teacher's right to be a homosexual was not
addressed. 10 3
One commentator who has considered the unanswered question has
suggested that a familiar test should be employed:
Courts are demonstrating a reluctance to enforce or bar conduct solely on the basis of
conventional wisdom, historical precedent, or "expert" opinion. Rather, they are
requiring that there be a connection between the conduct in question and actual
teaching performance. 0 4
Applying this test to the situation at hand, it would be necessary to show that
the teacher's homosexuality affects his teaching performance before it would
be possible to remove him from his position.10 5 Such an approach elevates
98. 359 F. Supp. 843, 857 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1975).
99. 491 F.2d at 502-04. Acanfora had belonged to the Homophiles of Penn State while
attending that university, and had intentionally omitted this affiliation from his application,
which asked for information about all the organizations to which he had belonged. Since he had
"purposely misled" school officials in order to be hired, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to
invoke its assistance. Id. at 501, 504. The court based its decision on Dennis v. United States, 384
U.S. 855 (1966). In Dennis, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner cannot challenge the
constitutional validity of a statute he deliberately attempts to circumvent. Id. at 866. However,
Dennis dealt with a criminal prosecution, while Acanfora was a civil suit. For a well reasoned
criticism of Acanfora on this basis, see 48 Temp. L.Q. 384, 393-96 (1975).
100. 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. CL 69 (1975).
101. Id. at 851.
102. Id. at 853.
103. Although the court found the dismissal to be "wrongful" it refused to order the plaintiff
reinstated. Id. at 854. See notes 210-15 infra and accompanying text.
104. La Morte, Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Homosexuals in Public Education, 4 J.
Law & Educ. 449, 466-67 (1975). See also Moskowitz & Casagrande, Teachers and the First
Amendment: Academic Freedom and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, 39 Albany L. Rev. 661 (1975). "In dealing with the problem of homosexual
teachers, the courts are faced with two basic questions. First, is homosexuality a legally
protectable interest? Second, if it is, upon what objective standard can a homosexual teacher's
employment be denied or terminated?... [Clourts seem unwilling to deny a homosexual teacher
employment solely on that basis, yet, they are also unwilling to employ a rational relation test to
weigh the effect of homosexuality on the particular school situation. To be consistent with the
standards utilized in such cases as James, Russo, Pickering, and Tinker, a rational relation test
should be employed by the courts to assess whether any measurable harm is occurring to a school
because of the employment of a homosexual teacher. If no harm is found, any termination for
homosexuality should be held invalid." Id. at 694 (italics omitted).
105. La Morte, Legal Rights and Responsibilities of Homosexuals in Public Education, 4 J.
Law & Educ. 449, 467 (1975).
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reason over passion, to whatever extent possible on an issue over which so
many have become passionate. To allow a teacher to be removed for his
status as a homosexual would be both unreasonable and unwarranted.
However, the school authorities, in their regulation of classroom speech,
could prohibit advocacy of homosexuality just as they have been permitted to
prohibit obscene speech. Homosexual advances toward students would un-
doubtedly be per se basis for dismissal, just as heterosexual activity between
teachers and their students has proven to be.
B. Heterosexuals
In cases involving private heterosexual conduct the courts have distin-
guished between teacher liaisons with students and those involving non-
students. Where school officials have questioned the morality of teachers'
conduct with non-students, the courts have been reluctant to permit any
sanctions. In Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District, 106 a case
dealing with non-tenured teacher aides, the Fifth Circuit ruled unconstitu-
tional the policy of a school district which forbade the employment of parents
of illegitimate children. 10 7 The court said that the schools have the right to
create a "properly moral scholastic environment" but that they must do so in a
manner consistent with the equal protection clause.' 0 8 The school board
advanced three justifications for its policy. First, it argued that unwed
parenthood is prima facie proof of present immorality. The court rejected this
reasoning, declaring that any equation of
illegitimate birth with irredeemable moral disease [was] not only patently absurd, it is
mischievous and prejudicial, requiring those who administer the policy to "investigate"
the parental status of school employees and prospective applicants. Where no stigma
may have existed before, such inquisitions by overzealous officialdom can rapidly
create it.' 0 9
The board next argued that students might seek to emulate the life styles of
the teacher-aides who were unwed mothers. This argument was also dis-
missed as "improbable" and "speculative,"'" 0 as was the board's third
rationale "that the presence of unwed parents in a scholastic environment
106. 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (No.
74-1318).
107. Id. at 617.
108. Id. at 614.
109. Id. at 615, quoting from the district court opinion, 371 F. Supp. 27, 34 (N.D. Miss.
1973) (footnote omitted). Indeed, if the investigation by the school officials contributes to the
notoriety of a given indiscretion by a school teacher, the board may be estopped from asserting
the impairment of public confidence as a ground for dismissal. See, e.g., Jerry v. Board of Educ.,
35 N.Y.2d 534, 544, 324 N.E.2d 106, 111, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446 (1974); notes 122-24 infra and
accompanying text.
In an unreported district court case, Caddell v. Johnson, No. CA-7-615 (N.D. Tex. June 20,
1972) the court would not allow the dismissal of a teacher who was discharged after a school
board member reported to the board that he had seen the teacher drive with a local waitress to a
country road and park for about 30 minutes. Rubin, supra note 1, at 109-11.
110. 507 F.2d at 616-17.
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materially contributes to school-girl pregnancies . ".'.. II The court seemingly
was following a policy recently articulated by an Illinois court, that "immoral-
ity" would be sufficient to justify dismissal only where consequent harm to
either pupils, faculty or the school itself could be shown.' 12
Not all jurisdictions take such a permissive approach. In Sullivan v. Meade
County Independent School District,11 3 a non-tenured elementary school
teacher in a rural school district was discharged because she was living with
her boyfriend. The school board justified the dismissal by showing the
plaintiffs conduct failed to meet community standards of morality. It
reasoned that continuance of the conduct set a bad example for her "impres-
sionable" pupils." 1 4 The court felt that these fears were reasonably based, and
that they represented the sentiment of the community at large. The court
concluded that community antagonism toward the plaintiff would make it
difficult for her to be effective in the classroom and that dismissal was
therefore justified.I s The Sullivan decision can be reconciled with Andrews.
In Andrews, broad sensibilities may have been affected, but nothing more
substantial could be found to justify dismissals. In Sullivan, however, the
court concluded that the plaintiff could not function effectively in the com-
munity since her conduct had engendered antagonism.
Two critical factors relied on in Sullivan are more clearly highlighted in
cases involving sexual activity between teachers and their students.
Though the teacher's sex life with outsiders, unless "notorious," ordinarily
may be a private affair, courts have invariably frowned on sexual liaisons
between teachers and their students. In Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, "16 a
junior college teacher was discharged after he was discovered by a sheriffs
deputy apparently engaging in a sexual act with a student in his car parked on
a dark street.11 7 The court held that either a potential for misconduct with
students or notoriety which would impair school relationships would be a
sufficient basis to discharge a teacher."18
111. Id. at 617.
112. Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 111. App. 3d 481, 485, 311 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1974). The
court in Reinhardt also adopted the language from Jarvella v. Villoughby-Eastlake City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 292, 233 N.E.2d 143, 146 (CL C.P. 1967): OThe private
conduct of a man, who is also a teacher, is a proper concern to those who employ him only to the
extent it mars him as a teacher .... Where his professional achievement is unaffected, where
the school community is placed in no jeopardy, his private acts are his own business and may
not be the basis of discipline." Id. at 485-86, 311 N.E.2d at 713.
113. 387 F. Supp. 1237 (D.S.D. 1975).
114. Id. at 1247.
115. Id. Factors which went into the decision included Miss Sullivan taught the first four
grades at a two-teacher elementary school; the trailer she and her boyfriend lived in was
one-eighth of a mile from the school; the trailer was provided by the school board; at a hearing
before the board, a petition with approximately 140 signatures was presented showing strong
community reaction. Id. at 1240-43, 1247.
116. 16 Cal. App. 2d 820, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318 (2d Dist. 1971).
117. Id. at 823, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The court noted that the teacher also assaulted the
sheriffs deputy and tried to escape. Id.
118. The facts demonstrated more than a potential for misconduct with students. Although
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The court recognized that the role of a teacher encompassed certain
restrictions"19 not imposed on other persons:
There are certain professions which impose upon persons attracted to them, respon-
sibilities and limitations on freedom of action which do not exist in regard to other
callings. Public officials such as judges, policemen and schoolteachers fall into such a
category. 1
20
As a result, the court held that the teacher's conduct had threatened the
integrity of the educational system, and that such a threat clearly justified his
dismissal. 121
The Stubblefield decision points out one factor that was underscored in
Sullivan-that community attitudes may place restrictions on teachers' pri-
vacy where sexual conduct is involved. Here, more than in speech or
association controversies, the threat, as seen by the community, is allowed to
dictate the result, without significant challenge by the teacher. While such an
approach is understandable, it is not clear that it is justified lacking the
development of reasonable standards. A recent New York decision, Jerry v.
Board of Education, 12 2 illustrates one attempt to develop such standards. In
Jerry, a male tenured high school guidance counselor was dismissed for
having spent an August night with an alumna of the June graduating class.
The court rejected the contention that constitutional protection of the teach-
er's right of privacy precluded the use of this information as a basis for
disciplinary proceedings. It declared that other interests had to be protected,
and that, in this instance, those of the school were paramount:
In our view what might otherwise be considered private conduct beyond the scope of
licit concern of school officials ceases to be such in at least either of two
circumstances-if the conduct directly affects the performance of the professional
responsibilities of the teacher, or if, without contribution on the part of school officials,
the conduct has become the subject of such public notoriety as significantly and
reasonably to impair the capability of the particular teacher to discharge the respon-
sibilities of his position.'
2 3
The court further stated that the five weeks between graduation and the
incident in question was sufficiently brief as to raise an inference of miscon-
duct during the school year, thus affecting "the performance of [professional]
responsibilities." 24
not necessary to its decision, the court suggested the notoriety requirement was also met because
of the "tenuous security from public attention provided by the front seat of defendant's
automobile." Id. at 826-27, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
119. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
120. 16 Cal. App. 3d at 824-25, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
121. Id. at 826-27, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
122. 35 N.Y.2d 534, 324 N.E.2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974).
123. Id. at 543-44, 324 N.E.2d at 111, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 446 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 544, 324 N.E.2d at 111, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 446. It is apparently possible to waive
the right to privacy by conduct which is sufficiently public. In Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d
1110 (1st Cir. 1974), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 530 (D. Mass. 1973) plaintiff, a tenured junior high school
teacher, was dismissed for "displaying and carrying on" on his property, in a lewd and suggestive
manner with a camera tripod, to which he had strapped a pillow and then clothed it with his
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Thus, the teacher's private sexual activity will be deemed to have an
adverse effect on the discharge of his duties, and will serve as a basis for
dismissal in either of two circumstances: (1) if the school board can show
either potential or actual misconduct with students or (2) if the school
authorities can show that the teacher's sexual activity with non-students is so
notorious (though not as a result of school board investigation) that it would
impair the integrity of the school in the eyes of the community.12s The burden
of proof on the board is less, however, than when freedom of speech is
involved. In that area, a "material and substantial" interference has to be
established. Where sexual conduct is involved, community resentment, if
sufficiently vocal, will suffice.
In the areas of permissible sexual conduct, the courts seem to be gravitating
toward allowing the community standards of morality to control, similar to
the modified community standard the Supreme Court has applied in obscenity
cases. 126 Whether a teacher's conduct will be protected will depend, therefore,
not only on the conduct itself, but also on the moral standards of the
community in which he chooses to work. To the extent that such a result
reflects a determination that the teacher's effectiveness has been significantly
impaired, dismissal represents a reasonable approach by the school board.
Where such is not the case, however, and there has been no showing of
misconduct with students or inability to function effectively, the attitudes of
the community alone should not be allowed to dictate the private conduct of
teachers. Here, as elsewhere, a balancing test should be employed, and only
where the community can show a greater interest than the teacher's corre-
sponding interest in his privacy should sanctions be allowed.
VII. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Discrimination in employment based upon sex or race is unlawful under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 127 However, until recently, the special
interest of the state in efficiently administering its educational system was held
wife's dress. "However convincing [plaintiffs] argument may be that private sexual conduct is
protected from governmental intrusion, the evidence in this case is ample that on various
occasions the conduct was public in nature or at least was carried on with such reckless disregard
of whether or not he was observed that it lost whatever private character it might have had." 367
F. Supp. at 535. Recognizing that teachers should be examples for their students, the court said:
"We have no doubt that the conduct would seem sufficiently bizarre and threatening so that, in
the minds of many, it would destroy his ability to serve as a role-model for young children." 500
F.2d at 1115.
125. See Fischer & Schimmel, supra note 1, at 60.
126. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973).
127. Section 2000e-2(a), provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .. " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. 11 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
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to justify mandatory pregnancy leave regulations 28 and "anti-nepotism" rules
which forbid employment of husband and wife teachers. 129 In addition, there
has been recent litigation concerning the extent to which teachers contribute
to and are affected by desegregation.' 30
Where sex discrimination is involved, the courts have required that school
boards demonstrate a legitimate purpose for policies that affect one sex
differently than the other.13 '
One notable group of cases in this area involved arbitrary pregnancy
regulations. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,132 the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a school board rule which required that
pregnant teachers take leave at the beginning of the fifth month of pregnancy.
The Court recognized that the state had a legitimate interest in preserving the
continuity of education,1 33 but the arbitrary cutoff date was not rationally
related to this purpose. The Court concluded that such a "sweeping manda-
tory" regulation was justified neither by a state interest in "keeping physically
unfit teachers out of the classroom" nor by the interest in continuity. 134
An example of a statute that met constitutional requirements can be found
in Geduldig v. Aiello.135 In this case, a California statute providing for
payment of disability benefits excluded disability resulting from normal
pregnancy. In holding that the statute did not violate the equal protection
clause the Court declared:
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage
of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other
physical condition.' 36
128. See notes 132-42 infra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 143-49 infra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 150-65 infra and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975). In Weise, two female
instructors claimed they were turned down for appointment in favor of less qualified males. The
Second Circuit did not decide the merits of the case, but remanded directing that the issue of state
action be judged by the "less onerous" standard heretofore reserved for cases involving racial
discrimination. This may be a step in adding sex to the list of suspect classifications which merit
strict judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
But a claim of sex discrimination will not justify the creation of a special position for the
claimant. In Zimdars v. Special School Dist. No. 1, - Minn. -, 230 N.W.2d 463 (1975), a
longtime mathematics teacher alleged discrimination in the failure of the school board to create an
intermediate position which would lead to an administrative role for her. The court rejected the
claim, holding that the law only prohibits discriminatory preference. Id. at -, 230 N.W.2d at
446.
132. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
133. Id. at 645-47.
134. Id. at 647-48.
135. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
136. Id. at 496-97 n.20. See Hutchison V. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1975) (No. 75-568), where a denial of sick
leave pay during pregnancy leave was held not to violate the equal protection clause.
DWINDLING RIGHTS OF TEACHERS
Thus, pregnancy leave policies that are shown to be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest will be allowed, while those policies that are shown to
be pretexts for sex discrimination will be barred. Two recent cases illustrate
this distinction.
In Paxman v. Wilkerson, 137 a school board rule required that a teacher who
becomes pregnant prior to the beginning of a new term must notify the
superintendent and obtain a release from her contract. The board argued that
this policy was distinguishable from that invalidated in LaFleur. The district
court, however, called the argument "a distinction without a difference,", 38
since the policy erroneously presumed unfitness at the beginning of the school
year, regardless of the stage of pregnancy. 139
In Leechburg Area School District v. Commonwealth Human Relations
Commission,14 0 the school board attempted to deny maternity leave to
unmarried female teachers. The Pennsylvania court found the regulation to be
discriminatory on the basis of sex, 14 1 suggesting that if the purpose of the rule
were to prohibit immoral conduct it would have to apply equally to male
teachers who had participated in extra-marital sex. 142
Pregnancy has not been the only area to give rise to examinations of
discrimination on the basis of sex. Discrimination has also been questioned in
two recent cases involving "anti-nepotism" rules which preclude simultaneous
employment of a husband and wife by the same educational body. In
Sanbonmatsu v. Boyer, 143 a New York appellate court struck down an
anti-nepotism rule which prohibited the spouse of a faculty member from
being appointed to a permanent position. The court found that the rule was
unnecessary, discriminatory, and without a valid purpose. 144 In twenty-seven
applications of the rule at this particular university it was always the husband
who received the permanent appointment, while the wife received only
temporary employment. Thus it was apparent that the rule had been unfairly
applied and that female teachers had been the victims. 4 5
In Keckeisen v. Independent School District 612, 146 however, the court
upheld that portion of a school district policy forbidding the employment of a
husband and wife in an administrator-teacher relationship. 147 Plaintiff, a high
137. 390 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Va. 1975).
138. Id. at 450.
139. Id. at 451. But see Richards v. Omaha Pub. Schools, - Neb. - 232 N.W.2d 29
(1975), where a mandatory pregnancy leave policy that required leave to begin at the start of the
semester was justified by the state interest in continuity of education.
140. - Pa. _, 339 A.2d 850 (Cmwlth. Ct. 1975).
141. Id. at ___. 339 A.2d at 853.
142. Id. at ___ 339 A.2d at 853.
143. 45 App. Div. 2d 249, 357 N.Y.S.2d 245 (4th Dep't 1974).
144. Id. at 253, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
145. Id. at 252-53, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 248-49.
146. 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No.
74-1503).
147. Id. at 1066. "The portion of the School Board's policy dealing with the employment of
husband-wife teams in the same building, where they are not in the administrator-teacher
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school principal, sought an injunction alleging that the rule infringed his right
to marry.' 4 8 The court upheld the policy, concluding that the rule was
designed to prevent favoritism and conflicts of interest, avoidance of which
was a valid concern of the school board. 149
The courts have thus looked closely at actions by the state that may have
the effect of sex discrimination. They will examine the purpose and applica-
tion of pregnancy leave and anti-nepotism policies to be sure that these
further a legitimate interest of the school authorities and are not merely
pretexts for sex discrimination.
In addition to close consideration of regulations based on sex, the recent
decisions have shown that a school board's hiring, assignment, and dismissal
of teachers will be carefully considered in determining whether racial dis-
crimination exists and will be affected by implementation of desegregation
orders. I5o
In Morgan v. Kerrigan,'-" the First Circuit affirmed a finding of racial
discrimination in the Boston public school system. The court said the use of a
ranking system based on scores on the National Teacher Examination for
hiring purposes had the effect of discriminating against blacks and that these
scores were not substantially related to job performance: "high test scores do
not indicate ability to teach."'15 2 It also found that the board's "segregative
assignment and transfer policies" had the effect of isolating "black students,
black teachers and black administrators in a limited number of schools,
thereby denying to those students the equal educational opportunity to which
they are constitutionally entitled."' 53 In a later action against implementation
relationship, is not challenged on this appeal and is not affected by our holding in this case." Id.
at 1065, n.2.
148. Id. at 1064-65, citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
149. "We have no doubt that in many cases where husbands and wives are employed in
supervisor-supervisee capacities, the married couple makes an exemplary effort to maintain
fairness, but we cannot say that a policy based on the assumption that married couples are
susceptible to the natural prejudices of their relationships is irrational, arbitrary or capricious."
509 F.2d at 1066.
150. Apart from desegregation orders, other forms of racial discrimination will not go
unredressed. See, e.g., Cross v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1975), where tile
court ordered appointment of a black teacher-coach to the position of head football coach and
athletic director. The court said where there has been a history of discriminatory hiring practices,
"subjective" criteria could not be used by the school board. The court found the plaintiff was
"objectively" more qualified than the white coach who was appointed because, inter alia, the
plaintiff had a better "win-loss" record during his coaching career.
151. 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
152. Id. at 597; accord, United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
153. Id. at 597-98; accord, Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975): "The inevitable result of assigning 80% of the system's
Black elementary staff to schools with predominantly Black student bodies was to increase the
identifiability of those schools as 'Black.' . . . (T]he disproportionate staff assignment by race
clearly supports the District Court's conclusion that school board policies and actions served to
create and strengthen the racial identifiability of certain schools as 'Black' and thereby to further
and perpetuate a dual school system in Kalamazoo." Id. at 185.
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of the district courfs desegregation order, the First Circuit would not evaluate
the fairness of giving qualified black teachers priority in hiring.'S
Dismissals are also affected by desegregation orders, as these often involve
the merger of black and white faculties, as well as students. To eliminate the
use of pretexts to justify discriminatory dismissals of teachers, the Fifth
Circuit, in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, '"5 laid
down guidelines for faculty dismissals in school districts under a desegregation
order. The court required school boards to develop and apply objective,
non-racial criteria for dismissal or demotion of staff members.15 6
In one recent case involving the dismissal of four black teachers, the same
circuit had occasion to apply the Singleton guidelines. In United States v.
Coffeeville Consolidated School District,5 7 the Fifth Circuit required the
Singleton standards of objective criteria to be set out in advance of any
dismissal proceedings, except in cases of dismissal which would be obviously
justifiable under any reasonable standards of teacher performance.158 In this
case, three black teachers were ordered reinstated and the dismissal of
another was remanded for a new trial.
While all three panel judges concurred in finding that the discharge for
incompetency of a shop teacher was improper under the requirements of
Singleton,'" the court was unanimous in reversing and remanding the
reinstatement of plaintiff Miller, who customarily disciplined her twelve-
year-old students by having them stand for ten minutes while touching their
toes. The court felt the absence of objective criteria would not excuse an act
that might "indicate a form of intolerable sadism."' 160 The court divided, but
affirmed the reinstatement of plaintiff Chapman, who had used an explicit
vulgarism during the course of a classroom discussion on homosexuality.' 6'
The court held that this "single instance of bad judgment" was not just cause
for dismissal. 162 Finally, the majority affirmed the reinstatement of plaintiff
154. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 599 (lst Cir. 1975). This was an action against the
district court's remedy, while the earlier case challenged its findings.
155. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970).
156. Id. at 1218.
157. 513 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1975).
158. Id. at 248-49. "[The hands of a school district are not tied. A school district does not
have to put up with incompetency, poor performance, failure to abide by school regulations, lack
of cooperation, or the like. All the district has to do is to develop objective, not subjective,
criteria, in advance." Id. Accord, Wright v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.
Tex. 1975). However, the court in Coffeeville noted that "under certain circumstances, Singleton
notwithstanding, discharges for just cause may be warranted without reference to any pre-
established objective, reasonable standards . . . ." 513 F.2d at 248 (italics deleted), citing
Thompson v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 476 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1973).
159. 513 F.2d at 249.
160. Id. at 249-50. "[A] girl, age twelve, called by Mrs. Miller as her own witness, testified
that she had been required to bend over touching her toes for about ten minutes, but that 'it did
not make her sick.' " Id. at 249.
161. Id. at 250-51.
162. Id. at 251. The dissent would have reversed, calling the finding of the district court
"dearly erroneous." Id. at 253 (dissenting opinion).
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Bennett who was dismissed for taping shut the mouths of students, paddling
second grade students, and driving to school in a car bearing the bumper
sticker: "IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED, TRY A-GUN." The court
held that such conduct was not "repulsive to the minimum standards of
decency" and affirmed Bennett's reinstatement. 1 63 Judge Coleman, dissenting,
said that to suggest violent sentiments to students "is something that a school
board and the general public ought not to have to tolerate. ' 164
In deciding whether to issue a desegregation order, the courts will consider
the hiring and assignment of teachers. After the order is issued they may
require the school board to develop objective non-racial criteria for dismissals
of teachers. 165 Such an approach demonstrates the importance the federal
courts have given to the elimination of racial discrimination.
Thus, the recent cases show a continuing judicial protection of the teacher's
right to be free from both racial and sexual discrimination. While contrary to
the general tendency of the courts of expanding the discretion of school
boards, this protection is understandable as an outgrowth of the more explicit
commands of the Supreme Court in this area.
VIII. THEm RIGHTS OF THE NON-TENURED TEACHER-
DUE PROCESS
If a tenured teacher is dismissed from his position he will be entitled under
traditional notions of due process to a hearing and to an explanation of the
reasons for his loss of employment.' 6 6 The type of procedure might vary
according to state statute 167 or local contract, 168 but in no case may the school
board eliminate it, since a tenured teacher's interest in his continued employ-
ment has been interpreted by the courts to be a property right within the
protection of the due process clause of the constitution.1 69
It is generally agreed that non-tenured teachers, absent some statutory or
contractual right, have no such constitutional right to procedural due process,
since there is no inherent property right in a non-tenured teaching position. 1
70
163. Id. at 251-53.
164. Id. at 253 (dissenting opinion).
165. See notes 155-64 supra and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
167. Not all state statutes address this question.
168. Fischer & Schimmel, supra note 1, at 133.
169. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952). See generally 41 Fordham L. Rev. 684 (1973).
170. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated
School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974). See Fischer & Schimmel, supra note 1, at 134-37. For
a general overview of the problems facing non-tenured as well as tenured teachers, see Frakt,
Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 Kan. L. Rev. 27, 39-53 (1969); Griffis & Wilson,
Constitutional Rights and Remedies in the Non-Renewal of a Public School Teacher's Employ-
ment Contract, 25 Baylor L. Rev. 549, 560-78 (1973); Lanzarone, Teacher Tenure-Some
Proposals for Change, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 526, 529-37 (1974); O'Brien, Due Process for the
Nontenured in Private Schools, 3 J. Law & Educ. 175 (1974); Developments in the Law-
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With a few important exceptions, 17' the non-tenured teacher who has just
been dismissed not only has no recourse by way of administrative hearing or
discovery, but also will find the courtroom door secured against his entry.
Prior to 1972, the general attitude of the courts to the plight of a dismissed
non-tenured teacher was that
[t]he board has the absolute right to decline to employ or to re-employ any applicant
for any reason whatever or for no reason at all. The board is responsible for its actions
only to the people of the city, from whom, through the mayor, the members have
received their appointments. It is no infringement upon the constitutional rights of
anyone for the board to decline to employ him as a teacher in the schools, and it is
immaterial whether the reason for the refusal to employ him is because the applicant is
married or unmarried, is of fair complexion or dark, is or is not a member of a trades
union, or whether no reason is given for such refusal. The board is not bound to give
any reason for its action. 172
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving the
rights of the non-tenured teacher, and these decisions have at least put a dent
in the invulnerable armor of the school board. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 173
the Court reaffirmed the general rule that non-tenured teachers have no right
to a statement of reasons or a hearing. 74 At the same time the Court
indicated that, if the non-tenured teachers, through custom or circumstance,
had an implied promise of continued employment, that interest would be
sufficient to create a property right that would entitle them to all the requisites
of due process. 175 In Perry v. Sindernmann, 176 the companion case to Roth,
the Court also indicated that, where the teacher's dismissal violated a
constitutionally protected right, the dismissal would be set aside.' 7 7 In addi-
Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1077-81 (1968); Note, Nichols v. Eckert: Due
Process Rights of Non-Tenured Teachers to Pre-Termination Hearings, 4 UCLA-Alaska L. Rev.
180 (1974).
171. See text accompanying notes 175-78 infra.
172. People ex rel. Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 IMI. 318, 325-26, 116 N.E. 158, 160
(1917), quoted in Fischer & Schimmel, supra note 1, at 134.
173. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
174. Id. at 569.
175. E.g., id. at 577; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972). In Roth, the Court
found that no implied promise existed, 408 U.S. at 578, but in Perry, the question was not so
easily disposed of. Sindermann's long service and the peculiar rules of the school which employed
him might have been sufficient to give Sindermann protection. 408 U.S. at 600. See Lanzarone,
Teacher Tenure-Some Proposals for Change, 42 Fordharn L. Rev. 526, 533-34 (1974).
176. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
177. Id. at 597. "For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benfit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This
would allow the government to 'produce a result which [it could not command directly.' ...
Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible." Id. (citation omitted).
19751
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tion to these two exceptions, a third basis for challenging actions of a school
board was set out by the Roth Court. Where a dismissal has been carried out
in such a way as to impinge the good name or reputation of the teacher, due
process will afford him an opportunity to refute the charges that led to the
dismissal. 178
These three exceptions to the general rule denying due process to non-
tenured teachers might, with a broad construction, be sufficient to give any
non-tenured teacher a right to a hearing upon a dismissal. 179 The courts have
not, however, taken a broad approach. Most cases which have granted
non-tenured teachers the right to challenge their dismissals have involved
clear deprivations of constitutionally guaranteed rights.' 8 0 Only in rare in-
stances have teachers been able to show the sort of "implied promise of
continued employment" that is the necessary prerequisite to a hearing and
statement of reasons.''
Two decisions in the Seventh Circuit illustrate the problem that faces the
non-tenured teacher. In Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School Dis-
trict, 1 8 2 a non-tenured teacher was dismissed without a hearing or adequate
explanation. She argued that the reasons of the school board were insufficient
and that, as such, the action denied her due process. 18 3 She did not allege that
any of her fundamental constitutional rights had been violated, nor that her
reputation had been brought into question. Nor did she allege such an
expectancy interest in continued employment as to justify application of that
exception.1 8 4 The Seventh Circuit held that none of the plaintiffs rights were
violated by the lack of proceedings, since she had no property right in
continued employment.' 8 5
More recently, a district court in the Seventh Circuit went even farther in
closing the courts to the non-tenured teacher. In Phillippe v. Clinton-Prairie
178. "A teacher dismissed for alleged theft of school funds, therefore, would be entitled to a
hearing to contest such a charge." Lanzarone, Teacher Tenure-Some Proposals for Change, 42
Fordham L. Rev. 526, 535 (1974). While, in the above example, there had clearly been damage to
the reputation of the teacher, the courts have divided on whether dismissal for incompetency is
similarly damaging. See id. at 535-37. As Professor Lanzarone points out, it may be especially
damaging today for a teacher to be dismissed for incompetence, due to the general scarcity of
teaching positions. Id. at 537. See Stewart v. Bailey, 396 F. Supp. 1381 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (where
plaintiffs reputation was attacked in causes for dismissal outlined in letter of termination, college
had initial burden of offering plaintiff a hearing).
179. It would seem that it would not be particularly difficult to allege at least an implication
of a promise of continued employment, barring complications, in any teacher's contract, and such
an implication could be construed to be a property right. However, the guidelines created in Roth
and Perry restrict such an approach.
180. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522
F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
181. Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970).
182. 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974).
183. Jeffries alleged that the reasons given for her dismissal were not only illogical but also
untrue. The court refused to investigate the truth or falsity however. Id. at 2-3.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 3.
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School Corp., 186 three non-tenured teachers active in union activities were
dismissed for reasons that, according to the school board, had nothing to do
with those activities. 1 8 7 The teachers involved, however, alleged that the real
reason behind the dismissals was the union activities and, as a result, the
dismissals had violated their rights of freedom of association and freedom of
speech. 188
The court disposed of any possible injury to reputation by noting that the
plaintiffs had not been unsuccessful as a result of their termination in finding
further employment.18 9 It also stated flatly that since tenure in the state was
governed by statute, there could be no expectation interest which might give
rise to a property right. 9 0 As to the alleged violations of constitutionally
protected rights, the court found that the reasons of the school board were
permissible, reasonable, and sufficient to preclude further inquiry. 19' As had
the court in Turkey Run, the court in Philippe refused to examine the validity
of the reasons given by the school board for their actions, declaring:
[S]ince an employee in plaintiffs position is not entitled to a hearing before the School
Board to determine if there is any basis in fact for the non-renewal decision, such rule
"applies equally to a claim that a federal court must conduct a hearing to make
precisely this same determination."' 92
Thus, in most cases, all that the dismissed teacher will be afforded is the
opportunity to prove that his constitutionally protected rights have been
violated. As to this allegation, it is not quite clear what burdens rest on the
plaintiff, or on the school board. Because the decision of the trial court will
rarely be reversed on appeal, however,' 93 meeting the burden becomes all the
more important.
186. 394 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
187. Id. at 318-19.
188. Id. at 318.
189. Id. at 322.
190. "A teacher-employee does not acquire the substantive rights of statutory terms provided
by Burns' Indiana Statutes, § 28-4501 et seq., IC 1971, 20-6-7-1, until such person serves more
than five years continuously with the same school authority." Id. at 318.
191. Id. at 319. Indeed, even if the plaintiff could show a legitimate protected interest, there
is no guarantee, in the Seventh Circuit at least, that due process would be afforded. See Miller v.
School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974), in which the importance of allowing the
school board latitude in its decision-making process was considered paramount to the individual
interest infringed upon by the board's action: "Although the interest of children in associating
with persons of their choice is, of course, severely limited by both their parents and the State, we
should not ignore the fact that they do have a valid interest in not being compelled to associate
with persons they or their parents consider objectionable. In the classroom, since their presence is
compelled, they necessarily must look to the school board for protection of this interest. For this
reason, it is appropriate for the school board, elected by the local community, to select the people
with whom it wants the minors of the community to associate as teachers." Id. at 667.
192. 394 F. Supp. at 319.
193. E.g., Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1975)
("Since there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that plaintiffs had
failed to meet their burden, a reversal would require a determination that the findings were
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Perhaps the approach of the Third Circuit in Roseman v. Indiana Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania194 is the most reasonable under these circumstances.
There, the district court placed on the plaintiff "the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that her non-retention was caused in substan-
tial part by restraint on her freedom of speech ... ."195 The Third Circuit, in
affirming the result, nevertheless indicated that
the district court appears to have misunderstood the proper standard of review where
a public employee alleges that his employment has been terminated in retaliation for
the exercise of protected speech. It is not enough merely to find that other grounds
were adequate for the discharge, or that retaliation did not constitute a substantial part
of the reason for the discharge. Instead, the plaintiff need only prove that the
discharge was "predicated even in part on his exercise of first amendment rights.' 96
It seems reasonable where constitutional rights are involved, that the
teacher should not have to do more than show that the exercise of his rights
was in some way responsible for his dismissal. To require more is to potentially
penalize the teacher for exercising his rights. 197 To require less is to poten-
clearly erroneous, that 'on the entire evidence [the court] is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.' '); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, S01 F.2d 31,
39 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Callahan v. Price, 513 F.2d S1,
53 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Aug. 19, 1975)
(75-238); Amburgey v. Cassady, 507 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1974); Frazier v. Curators of Univ.
of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 1974).
Trial courts as a rule have hesitated to challenge the discretionary exercise of power by the
school board. See, e.g., Gorham v. Jewett, 392 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D. Mass. 1975); Doscher v.
Seminole Common Consol. School Dist. No. One, 377 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1974): "It
is not the function of this court to make a determination as to the wisdom of the board's decision
so long as there does not appear to be any arbitrary or capricious action .... "
194. 520 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1975).
195. Roseman v. Hassler, 382 F. Supp. 1328, 1339 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
196. 520 F.2d at 1367. This approach has also been adopted by the Second Circuit in
Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973), where a non-tenured teacher claimed
that his contract was not renewed because of union activity. "While we have concluded that
adequate evidence supported the Board's action, that does not necessarily defeat a claim of
retaliatory nonrenewal; a discharge motivated only in part by demonstrable retaliation for
exercise of speech and associational rights is equally offensive to the Constitution." The court
affirmed the action because the Board members testified they had only considered the plaintiffs
conduct as a teacher. Id. at 995-96; see Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520
F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975): "A decision to terminate employment of a teacher which is only partially
in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right is unlawful." Id. at 806 (emphasis deleted).
See also Rubin, supra note 1, at 15. Thus, if a teacher were discharged for being an incompetent
and a Republican the result absent sufficient testimony in the trial record, would be a remand to
determine if the school board would have fired the teacher if he were only incompetent.
Finally, where racial discrimination has been alleged, the burden of proof shifts to the school
board to show that its action was in no way racially motivated. See, e.g., Moore v. Board of
Educ., 448 F.2d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1971); Cato v. Collins, 394 F. Supp. 629, 632 (E.D. Ark.
1975).
197. Not all judges agree that the substantive constitutional rights of teachers should be
protected. At least one has declared: "If we as Americans are at the moment dissatisfied with the
permissive and chaotic nature of society in general, then surely one of the reasons for this
19751 DWINDLING RIGHTS OF TEACHERS
tially penalize the school boards by making it impossible for them to effec-
tively act. The approach taken in Roseman, however, would protect the
teacher without harassing the school board, and this is the "balance" that
should be sought.
IX. JURISDICTION
Perhaps the most significant trend in the recent decisions is the approach of
the federal courts to the jurisdictional question. The majority of actions in
federal courts brought by teachers against school authorities for denial of
constitutional rights allege jurisdiction under section 1343 for denial of rights
guaranteed by section 1983.198 However, the question of whether the school
board qua school board is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983 has
resulted in a conflict among the circuits.
In Burt v. Board of Trustees, 199 the Fourth Circuit said the assumption on
the part of the district court "that the Board itself was not a suable party
under § 1983 was correct .... ,,200 Conversely in Keckeisen v. Independent
School District,2 0 1 the Eighth Circuit said "municipal corporations were not
intended to be included as 'persons' under § 1983 ... but it would defeat the
central intention of the Civil Rights Act to disallow actions against individuals
employed by municipal corporations. '20 2 The court held the school board
was a "person" and that plaintiff had stated a cause of action under section
1983.203 Under the doctrine of Monroe v. Pape, the teacher can obtain jur-
unfortunate state of affairs is the myopic fascination of courts not only with procedural due
process which is within their sphere, but also with the substantive due process which, except in
extraordinary circumstances, is wholly outside the courts' legitimate sphere in any well reasoned
apportionment of governmental powers." Beverlin v. Board of Educ., - W. Va. -, 216
S.E.2d 554, 560 (1975) (Neely, J., dissenting).
198. Section 1343 provides in part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . (3) To redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any
right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970).
199. 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curium).
200. Id. at 1204 n.3.
201. 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 57 (1975).
202. Id. at 1065.
203. Id. at 1064-65. See, e.g., Aurora Educ. Ass'n East v. Board of Educ., 490 F.2d 431, 435
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985 (1974); see also Stebbins v. Weaver, 396 F. Supp. 104
(W.D. Wisc. 1975) (suggesting that section 1983 would not bar suit under these circumstances);
but see Sellers v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 432 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 981 (1971) (indicating jurisdiction is improper under section 1983); but cf. Campbell v.
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isdiction over the individual members of the school board either in their offi-
cial or individual capacities, but this result raises problems of remedies.
20 4
An alternative jurisdictional basis to section 1983 was implemented in Gray
v. Union County Intermediate Education District.20 There the plaintiff
alleged jurisdiction under section 1331206 claiming that her suit involved a
federal question with over $10,000 in controversy.2 0 7 The court reasoned that
since plaintiff charged a violation of her constitutional rights and sought back
pay and $100,000 in incidental damages, the requirements of section 1331
were met.20° Basing jurisdiction on this section avoided the "person" re-
quirements of section 1983 under which political subdivisions are immune
from suit.20 9
A recent district court decision, however, has held jurisdiction lacking
under both section 1983 and section 1331. In Fanning v. School Board of
Independent School District No. 23,210 a non-tenured teacher claimed his
non-renewal was based on his union activities. The court said the school
board was not a person under section 1983 and that, therefore, damages and
injunctive relief were not available. 211 The court also held that jurisdiction
could not be based on section 1331 since the teacher's contract was not
renewed pursuant to a state statute. Thus, the question arose under state, not
federal law.2 12 The court would not hear the case, saying, "actions of local
school officials involving these types of issues are pre-eminently and peculiarly
in the local province. '21 3
Masur, 486 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Gre(en v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 629 (9th Cir.
1973).
204. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe held that individual police officers, but not the city itself,
were subject to liability for damages under section 1983. In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507 (1973), the Court held that equitable relief was similarly unavailable in an action against a
municipality under section 1983. Id. at 513.
The courts will generally not require a plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies before
bringing an action under section 1983, the theory being that the purpose of the section Is to
provide a federal remedy supplementary to the state remedy. See McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d
357 (4th Cir. 1975) cert. granted 44 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1975) (No. 75-44). But see
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). See generally, Moskowltz
& Casagrande, Teachers and the First Amendment: Academic Freedom and Exhaustion of Ad-
ministrative Remedies Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 39 Albany L. Rev. 661, 694-704 (1975).
205. 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975).
206. Section 1331(a) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
207. Plaintiff also alleged jurisdiction under section 1983. The court noted the "person"
controversy but found it unnecessary to rule on the question. 520 F.2d at 805.
208. Id.
209. Id., citing City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). See note 204 supra.
210. 395 F. Supp. 18 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
211. Id. at 21.
212. Id. at 20-23.
213. Id. at 23. Another basis for jurisdiction was found in Kelly v. West Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 517 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975), where the court reinstated two black non-tenured
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In Grossman v. Bernards Township Board of Education, 2 1 4 another recent
district court case, plaintiff was dismissed from a teaching position because
she had undergone a sex change operation. Plaintiff alleged six jurisdictional
bases, but the action was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief might be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held
that the school board, as a political subdivision of the state, was not an
"employer"215 within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act of
1947.216 Further, there was no jurisdiction under section 1981, because that
statute protects only against racial discrimination.2 1 7 Nor were sections 1983
and 1985 relevant, since the school board was not a "person" within the
meaning of these statutes. 218 Finally, the court said plaintiff did not state a
cause of action for sex discrimination under the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972,219 because she was discharged "not because of her status
as a female, but rather because of her change in sex from the male to the
female gender. 220
It seems dear that in seeking to avoid becoming entangled in the adminis-
tration of the schools, the federal courts have been slowly closing their
jurisdictional doors to teachers seeking to challenge unconstitutional actions
against them. The question of the extent of the teacher's substantive constitu-
tional rights truly becomes moot if the teachers are unable to get into court to
determine if those rights have been wrongfully abridged. The solution to the
jurisdictional problems of section 1983 is to allow the teachers seeking to
redress a denial of constitutional rights to bring actions under section 1331
against the school board qua school board. This result also has the advantage
of avoiding the remedies problems inherent in actions against individual
school board members.
X. REMEDIES
Even if the teacher prevails in establishing jurisdiction and proving his
case, he may find that he is still without a remedy. 22 1 It seems clear that a
non-tenured public school teacher is entitled to damages and equitable relief,
under section 1983, if his discharge or denial of tenure or reemployment is in
retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights. 22 2 Unique consid-
erations of community attitudes, however, may frequently make equitable
teachers, holding that cases alleging racial discrimination can have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.
1981 (1970), thereby avoiding the "person" controversy of section 1983.
214. No. 74-1904 (D.N.J., Sept. 10, 1975).
215. Id. at 3-4.
216. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. (1970).
217. No. 74-1904 at 4.
218. Id. at 4-5. The court also held that section 1988 creates no substantive federal cause of
action.
219. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e), et seq. (Supp. 1974).
220. No. 74-1904 at 6.
221. See generally, Griffis & Wilson, Constitutional Rights and Remedies in the Non-Renewinal
of a Public School Teacher's Employment Contract, 25 Baylor L. Rev. 549, 578-93 (1973).
222. See, e.g., Amburgey v. Cassady, 507 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1974).
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relief difficult to effect.223 One recent Ninth Circuit decision dramatizes the
problem that faces the court. In Burton v. Cascade School District Union
High School No. 5,224 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a homosexual non-tenured
teacher was wrongfully dismissed because the statute providing for discharges
for "immorality" was unconstitutionally vague. The court refused to order the
plaintiff reinstated, calling reinstatement an "extraordinary equitable rem-
edy" 225 limited to teacher dismissals involving racial discrimination and
reprisals for the exercise of free speech. It held the district court was acting
within the bounds of its remedial discretion in awarding plaintiff a half year
salary in addition to the award of back pay for the unserved portion of her
one year contract. 226 The court agreed it was proper to balance plaintiffs
interest in completing the few months left in her contract against the disrup-
tion her reinstatement would cause to the school and the community. 2 27
Judge Lumbard, dissenting, declared that reinstatement, far from being
"extraordinary," was the proper remedy for "an individual who has been
removed from her job in violation of the Constitution. '228 He reasoned that if
community resentment was allowed to defeat constitutional rights, few school
districts would ever be desegregated. In addition, Judge Lumbard found the
award of damages inappropriate, for such an award would allow the school
board to replace constitutional rights by means of the state's treasury.22 9
On the question of damages, several important immunities may totally
defeat recovery from individual school board members. While such persons
are proper parties under section 1983, the Tenth Circuit suggested in Bertot v.
School District No. 1230 that they are immune from damages if they have
acted in good faith. 231 To recover damages from a school board member the
223. See Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850, 852-53 (9th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975).
224. 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 69 (1975). See notes
110-14 supra and accompanying text.
225. Id. at 853.
226. Id. at 854.
227. Id. at 853. Regarding equitable relief, the Fourth Circuit said in Burt v. Board of
Trustees of Edgefield County School Dist., 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975), that in a suit against
the school board members, as individuals, they would not even have the power to "reinstate or
order back pay out of school board or county funds." Id. at 1204.
228. 512 F.2d at 854 (dissenting opinion).
229. Id. at 855-56 (dissenting opinion).
230. 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
231. Id. at 1184. The court quoted from Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975): "There-
fore, in the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board member is not
immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known
that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional
rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. That is not to say that school
board members are 'charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law.' . . . A
compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with such an
impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional
rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." Id. at 322
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teacher would have to prove he "acted with a malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury." 232 The rationale for such
a requirement was to permit individual board members to exercise their duties
free from fear of damage suits, by affording them a qualified privilege. 233
If the members of the school board are sued in their official capacity, or if
the school board qua school board can be made a party, 234 it has been argued
that recovery of damages would be barred by the sovereign immunity of the
state under the eleventh amendment. 235 Such an argument has been rejected
in recent circuit court cases.2 36 If, however, the school board is set up as an
agency or "alter ego" of the state, sovereign immunity may still attach. 37
In Edelman v. Jordan,2 38 the Supreme Court held that an order directing
the Illinois Department of Public Aid to pay retroactive welfare payments was
barred by the eleventh amendment.2 39 In Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School
District No. 7,240 the Ninth Circuit recently held that this did not mean that
(citation omitted). See Shirley v. Chagrin Falls Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Educ., 521 F.2d
1329, 1332 (6th Cir. 1975) ("The question, therefore, is whether the school board action taken
with regard to Mrs. Shirley was not only violative of her constitutional rights, but was also at
that time so in disregard of the 'settled, indisputable law' and 'unquestioned constitutional rights'
that it cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith."); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego
School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239
(U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No. 75-568) ("The school board members did not disregard 'settled,
indisputable law' " in enforcing a pregnancy leave policy. "ITIhe board members clearly acted in
good faith and within their official capacities and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity
from the payment of damages."). Thus, the determination of whether a school board member in
his individual capacity will enjoy immunity from damages must undergo the following analysis: if
the action violates a teacher's undisputed constitutional right, the intent of the school board
members is irrelevant and they will be liable for damages. If, however, the nature and extent of
constitutional protection is unsettled, the school board members will be immune unless the
teacher can prove that they acted with malicious intent.
232. 522 F.2d at 1185.
233. Id.
234. This assumes the school board is a "person" under section 1983 or that another
jurisdictional basis exists. See notes 198-220 supra and accompanying text.
235. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI.
236. See Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1205 (4th Cir. 1975); Hutchison v.
Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 966-68 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No. 75-538). See also King v. Caesar Rodney School
Dist, 396 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1975).
237. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 40-41 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 421 U.S. 983 (1975). See also George B. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr.
Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 179-82 (lst Cir. 1974).
238. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
239. Id. at 678. This defense need not be asserted in trial court to be raised on appeal. -ITIhe
Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it
need not be raised in the trial court .. " Id.
240. 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Oct. 21,
1975) (No. 75-568).
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all state subdivisions were necessarily immune from damages, but rather that
the character of the agency had to be examined. The court stated that, to be
immune under the eleventh amendment, the school board would have to be
an "alter ego" of the state. The most important factor in this determination
would be whether the judgment would have to be paid out of the state
treasury. 24 1 Since, in Hutchison, funds came from local sources the school
board had the power to obtain funds to satisfy a monetary judgment. Further,
since it was precluded by statute from applying state funds to satisfy such a
levy, eleventh amendment immunity did not apply.2
42
The recent decisions have cast doubt on the judicial relief available to the
teachers who have been dismissed in reprisal for the exercise of their constitu-
tional rights. The equitable remedy of reinstatement is always discretionary,
and an award of damages may be barred by lack of jurisdiction or by
immunity. Thus, the teacher who can successfully prove that his uncertain
constitutional rights have been violated may still find the federal courts
unwilling or unable to furnish a remedy. Such a state of affairs should prove
disturbing to teachers and non-teachers alike. That a teacher has been
employed by a public entity should not lead to the conclusion that lie has
consented to be stripped of the rights and remedies guaranteed to all other
citizens, and any result that seems to flow from such a conclusion should be
resisted.
XI. CONCLUSION
The teacher who is dismissed for the exercise of a constitutional right is
virtually forced into court, for in today's job market an uncontested dismissal
for cause is a professional kiss of death.2 43 The federal courts, however, have
gradually closed their doors to these suits, perhaps in the belief that school
administration is a local matter, or perhaps out of the apprehension of
entering into situations requiring continuing judicial supervision.
Procedurally, the obstacles which block access to the courts by a dismissed
teacher are paradoxical. The Supreme Court has tried to give teachers the
same substantive rights as other citizens, to the extent that they may be
balanced with valid community interests. By placing heavy burdens of proof
on the teacher, removing any viable remedies that might exist for him, and
241. Id. at 966.
242. Id. at 966-68. Other factors cited by the court were: "performance by the entity of an
essential governmental function, ability to sue or be sued, power to take property in its own name
or in the name of the State, and corporate status of the entity." Id. at 966. Accord, Burt v. Board
of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1205 (4th Cir. 1975). Compare Stebbins v. Weaver, 396 F.
Supp. 104, 110-11 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (eleventh amendment would not bar money judgment
against a school board member in his official capacity, but the amendment would bar a
retroactive money judgment against the board) with King v. Caesar Rodney School Dist., 396 F.
Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1975) (school board was not an "alter ego" of the state and not immune under
the eleventh amendment).
243. See U.S. News and World Rep., Sept. 1, 1975, at 53: "In Michigan, 6,000 pink slips had
already been sent out ... because enrollment declines were reducing demand for teachers. In the
meantime, schools of education in that State are turning out 11,000 job-hungry graduates a year."
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finding that the teacher cannot get jurisdiction over any of the parties who
have injured him, the lower federal courts have made the substantive rights
articulated by the Supreme Court a hollow echo.
More reasonable approaches to the procedural issues would not be impossi-
ble to develop. An allegation by a teacher that his discharge was predicated
on a violation of his constitutional rights ought to be enough to state a cause
of action. Additionally, even non-tenured teachers should be assured a fair
hearing upon dismissal, recognizing that they are indeed injured by dismissal.
Finally, there is no reason why a teacher who has been wrongfully dismissed
should not be granted an appropriate remedy. If such a remedy is reinstate-
ment, it ought to be allowed.
If the procedural roadblocks can be surmounted, substantive issues %%ill
again have meaning for a dismissed teacher. Essentially, all substantive
problems involving teacher's rights depend on one fundamental issue: the role
of the teacher in the community, and the discretion of the school board in
fixing that role.
To the extent that the courts have defined the substantive rights of
teachers, the trend has been to gradually contract the earlier definitions by
application of balancing tests. Courts have not directly limited teachers' rights
but they have allowed a wider range of state interests to outweigh the
teacher's interest in the free exercise of his constitutional rights.
It may be traditional or expedient to vest broad discretion in local school
boards,2 44 but it is questionable whether it is advisable to vest such powers in
boards when important constitutional guarantees are involved. Therefore,
along with this broad grant of authority which is the source of community
control of the schools, there should be a corresponding duty on the part of the
school boards to secure the protections of the Constitution for their employees.
The most flagrant abuses of discretion could be mitigated by requiring that
non-tenured teachers be provided with statements of reasons for termination.
The practice of limiting the constitutional rights of teachers to a greater
extent than those of other public employees is based, at least in part, on the
idea that a teacher does more than just deliver information to his students.
Society expects and may require that the teacher also function as an example
to his pupils.2 45 The values a teacher should transmit and the methods he
244. This notion is not without the support of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) ("The system of public education that has evolved in this
Nation relies necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school
board members, and § 1983 was not intended to be a vehicle for federal court correction of errors
in the exercise of that discretion which do not rise to the level of violations of specific
constitutional guarantees.'); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("Judicial interposi-
tion in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and
restraint . . .By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state
and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise
in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values.').
245. "All education implies the transmission of values. How a teacher acts toward children;
how he resolves disputes among them; whether or not he requires children to be responsible for
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chooses to transmit them may be subject to the approval of the local
community. In fact,
[m]ost parents, students, school boards, and members of the community usually expect
the secondary school to concentrate on transmitting basic information, teaching "the
best that is known and thought in the world," training by established techniques, and,
to some extent at least, indoctrinating in the mores of the surrounding society.
2 16
However, the danger of sanctifying conformity is always present when
relying upon consensus judgments for a determination of right behavior.2 47
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Adler v. Board of Education, stated:
A pall is cast over the classrooms. There can be no real academic freedom in that
environment. Where suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their
jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect. Supineness and dogmatism take the
place of inquiry. A "party line"--as dangerous as the "party line" of the Communists-
lays hold. It is the "party line" of the orthodox view, of the conventional thought, of the
accepted approach. A problem can no longer be pursued with impunity to its edges.
Fear stalks the classroom. The teacher is no longer a stimulant to adventurous
thinking; she becomes instead a pipeline for safe and sound information. A deadening
dogma takes the place of free inquiry. Instruction tends to become sterile; pursuit of
knowledge is discouraged; discussion often leaves off where it should begin.2 48
Thus, the right of the teacher to work without fear of retaliation over
trivialities is an important element in academic freedom which must concern
us all, for in our schools lies the future of our country. Teachers must be sure
of their own rights and not afraid to exercise them out of fear of retaliation.2 49
As Justice Douglas declared,
themselves and to act responsibly toward others-in short, every lesson he teaches, decision he
makes, every expectation he holds, has the potential of influencing his students' ideas about the
world .... By refusing to guide, inspire, prod or challenge his students, by withholding choices
and declining to impart skills and attitudes, he may be actively blocking the child's freedom and
growth." U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 1, 1975, at 43, quoting author and education critic
Diane Ravitch.
246. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1971).
247. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also R.
Emerson, Self-Reliance, in The Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 145, 152 (1969): "A foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself
with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words and to-morrow speak
what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day.-
'Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood.' -Is it so bad then to be misunderstood?
Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and
Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be
misunderstood."
248. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
249. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), Mr. Justice Powell suggested that the need for
discipline in the schools may be as important as more traditional concepts of education: "The
State's generalized interest in maintaining an orderly school system is not incompatible with the
individual interest of the student. Education in any meaningful sense includes the inculcation of
an understanding in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This understand-
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We need be bold and adventuresome in our thinking to survive. A school system
producing students trained as robots threatens to rob a generation of the versatility
that has perhaps been our greatest distinction. The Framers knew the danger of
dogmatism; they also knew the strength that comes when the mind is free, when ideas
may be pursued wherever they lead 250
Peter J. Neckles
ing is no less important than learning to read and write. One who does not comprehend the
meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not merely in his education but throughout his
subsequent life. In an age when the home and church play a diminishing role in shaping the
character and value judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls upon the schools." Id.
at 592-93 (Powell, J., dissenting).
250. 342 U.S. at 511. The following news item illustrates what the independent teacher in a
hostile community may be up against "High school authorities in Drake, N.D. raided student
lockers in November, 1973, and confiscated as profane all copies of 'Slaughterhouse Five,' by
Kurt Vonnegut Jr., and 'Deliverance,' by James Dickey. Copies of the Vonnegut novel were
burned. 'Deliverance' was banned.
"Bruce Severy, the 26-year-old English teacher who had assigned the books, sued in Federal
court in February, 1974, charging deprivation of academic freedom. In June, 1974, his contract
to teach was not renewed.
"Last week the court case was settled. The Drake Board of Education has agreed that
'Slaughterhouse Five' and 'Deliverance' can be taught in the 11th and 12th grades. Mr. Severy,
who now lives in Fargo, N.D., will get $5,000 in damages, and he agrees not to seek
reinstatement as a teacher in Drake.
" I don't feel there would be any point to going back there now after two years,' he says. 'I
don't think it would be safe.'
"In his last months in Drake, he reports, death threats were made against him, his wife and
their 7-year-old daughter.
"Mr. Severy, who was represented by the American Civil Liberties Union in his court action, is
unemployed at present . . ." N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1975, at 43, col. 1.
